Augustine’s Divided Line Essay -- Essays Papers

Augustine’s Divided Line Augustine’s contention that man cannot possibly come into truth by reason in his temporal life constitutes his initial departure from the ancients, and results in the need for an entirely new structuring of the relationship between man and the good. In differentiating between the nature of God and man, Augustine argues that man’s nature—unlike God’s—is corruptible, and is thus â€Å"deprived of the light of eternal truth† (XI, 22) . This stands the thought of Plato on its head, since now no amount of contemplation and argument will be capable of getting man closer to a truth that exists on a plane that â€Å"surpasses the reach of the human mind† (XXI, 5). If reason is an instrument as flawed as man himself, how, then, is man to know the supreme good if he is forced to grope blindly for it in a state of sin without any assistance from the powers of his own mind? It is this question which serves as the premise for Augustine’s di vision of existence into the City of Man and the City of God and articulation of a system of vice and struggle against vice that keeps man anchored to the City of Man and prevents him from entering the City of God in temporal life. In order to explain man’s path from the one to the other, he sets up a system of dichotomies that originate from Adam’s fall and are hinged upon the role of the will in earthly life. At the top, God is the source of the â€Å"supreme good,† and evil is its opposite (XII, 3). Up to this point, he is in agreement with the ancients, but he diverges again when he equates the good with nature, and evil with a defect of nature—an absence of the good (XII, 3). In this we have the first division of what â€Å"supremely is† between nature and vice, with nature arising ... ...ty† (XII, 22). This is ultimately what is so shockingly egalitarian about Augustine’s Christianity in contrast to the thought of the ancients. The Supreme Good—eternal life—is accessible to both the simple and the sophisticated. One may either contemplate the duality of the universe and figure out where each aspect of creation fits into the scheme, or one may bypass the attempt to understand the temporal world in relation to heaven, but so long as one finally accepts faith and, through it, becomes obedient to God while discarding self-will, the extent to which one used reason in his life is irrelevant. Reason, except insofar as it is necessary in a basic sense for man to use it to accept faith to and differentiate himself from beasts, is not necessary for eternal life. What is necessary is the choice to stop exercising the self-will—to stop making choices. Augustine’s Divided Line Essay -- Essays Papers Augustine’s Divided Line Augustine’s contention that man cannot possibly come into truth by reason in his temporal life constitutes his initial departure from the ancients, and results in the need for an entirely new structuring of the relationship between man and the good. In differentiating between the nature of God and man, Augustine argues that man’s nature—unlike God’s—is corruptible, and is thus â€Å"deprived of the light of eternal truth† (XI, 22) . This stands the thought of Plato on its head, since now no amount of contemplation and argument will be capable of getting man closer to a truth that exists on a plane that â€Å"surpasses the reach of the human mind† (XXI, 5). If reason is an instrument as flawed as man himself, how, then, is man to know the supreme good if he is forced to grope blindly for it in a state of sin without any assistance from the powers of his own mind? It is this question which serves as the premise for Augustine’s di vision of existence into the City of Man and the City of God and articulation of a system of vice and struggle against vice that keeps man anchored to the City of Man and prevents him from entering the City of God in temporal life. In order to explain man’s path from the one to the other, he sets up a system of dichotomies that originate from Adam’s fall and are hinged upon the role of the will in earthly life. At the top, God is the source of the â€Å"supreme good,† and evil is its opposite (XII, 3). Up to this point, he is in agreement with the ancients, but he diverges again when he equates the good with nature, and evil with a defect of nature—an absence of the good (XII, 3). In this we have the first division of what â€Å"supremely is† between nature and vice, with nature arising ... ...ty† (XII, 22). This is ultimately what is so shockingly egalitarian about Augustine’s Christianity in contrast to the thought of the ancients. The Supreme Good—eternal life—is accessible to both the simple and the sophisticated. One may either contemplate the duality of the universe and figure out where each aspect of creation fits into the scheme, or one may bypass the attempt to understand the temporal world in relation to heaven, but so long as one finally accepts faith and, through it, becomes obedient to God while discarding self-will, the extent to which one used reason in his life is irrelevant. Reason, except insofar as it is necessary in a basic sense for man to use it to accept faith to and differentiate himself from beasts, is not necessary for eternal life. What is necessary is the choice to stop exercising the self-will—to stop making choices.